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Arbitrator's power to procure third party assistance
by Julian Critchlow
In Colt International v Tarmac Construction 
Ltd (1996) CILL 1145, it was held that 
legal representatives have an obligation to 
assist arbitrators; they may not observe 
him flounder in unfamiliar territory and 
then apply to the court alleging that he 
has proceeded irregularly. However, not 
all parties will choose legal assistance and 
even where they do, the efficient conduct 
of a reference may require the provision 
to the arbitrator of more consistent, 
thoroughgoing and independent 
assistance than may be available from the 
parties' representatives. Arbitrations can 
be complex, involving difficult questions 
of fact, substantive law and procedural 
law. The availability to the arbitrator of 
legal assistance may reduce the incidence 
of legally erroneous awards and, similarly, 
technical assistance may reduce 
technically or factually erroneous awards.
The concept of an arbitrator obtaining 
independent legal advice is not new. 
Indeed, historically, the judges would 
sometimes, with the consent of the 
parties, leave technical matters, especially 
the taking of account, to a referee (see 
Mustill and Boyd, 2nd ed, at p. 44 f). Of 
more direct significance, RSC Order 40 
empowers the court to appoint an expert 
or experts:
'... to enquire and report upon any 
question offact or opinion not involving 
questions of law and construction.'
The commentary contained in RSC 
Order 40/1- 6/1 states:
'The object of the Order is presumably to 
enable the parties to save costs and expenses in 
engaging separate experts in respect of 
technical or scientific questions which can be 
resolved fully, quickly and comparatively 
cheaply by an independent expert appointed by 
the Court, and also possibly to prevent the 
Court being left without expert assistance in 
cases which the experts of the parties may well 
be giving entirely contradictory evidence on 
technical or scientific questions.'
It should be noted that the provision 
can only be operated where a party 
applies to the court: it is not exercisable 
by the court of its own motion. However, 
there has been much debate as to 
whether the court should have that 
power irrespective of the wishes of the
parties. In his interim report Access to 
Justice (June 1995), Lord Wool f states:
'The appointment of a court expert or, as 
the London Solicitors' Litigation Association 
has pointed out to the Inquiry, more 
appropriately an 'independent expert', is one 
solution which has been extensively canvassed. 
It is, however, a solution which attracts strong 
criticism ... The Official Referees are at present 
engaged in an experiment to ascertain whether 
greater use can be made of Order 40 ... the 
question to be asked was "whether it is likely 
to assist in the just, expeditious and 
economical disposal of the action. "' (ch. 23, 
para. 20, p. 186)
The unwillingness of parties to take 
advantage of a court-appointed expert is in 
sharp contrast to the position in civil law 
jurisdictions, where this is the normal course. ' 
(ch. 23, para. 186, at p. 20).
The court is perfectly capable of deciding 
which cases would be appropriate for a court 
expert and then of appointing an expert with 
the necessary qualifications and ensuring that 
he is used effectively.' (ch. 23 para. 23, at 
p. 187)
Again, in Scotland, it is commono
practice for a legal assessor to sit with a 
lay arbitrator.
There are provisions (referred to 
below) in the Arbitration Act 1996 in 
respect of the arbitrator taking advice. 
This paper considers the extent of any 
need to allow the arbitrator to take such 
advice, and whether the Act's provisions 
satisfy any such need.
OBTAINING ADVICE
Turning again to the Colt v Tarmac case, 
referred to above, it is stated at p. 1146 
of the CILL report:
'A dispute arose in the arbitration as to 
whether Tarmac had complied with the 
arbitrator's discovery order ... The arbitrator 
indicated that, if Colt persisted with their 
discovery application against Tarmac, which 
involved the question of waiver of privilege, he 
would wish to take advice from Queen 's 
Counsel. '
'Colt suggested that the discovery 
application merited the appointment of a legal 
assessor to sit with the arbitrator; the 
arbitrator gave an indication that he doubted
whether it was necessary to have a QC sitting 
with him, and that if Colt insisted then the
costs would have to be borne by Colt in anyj j
event. Colt complained that the arbitrator had 
pre-judged that issue, where - upon [sic] the 
arbitrator indicated that he would review the 
position in the light of submissions made to 
him at the forthcoming hearing. In the event, 
the arbitrator embarked upon the application 
without a QC sitting with him, but it became 
apparent that he did need legal advice upon 
the submissions made to him. Colt complained 
that the terms upon which the arbitrator 
sought that advice were too wide, and applied 
for his removal for misconduct.'
In the event, the application failed. 
However the arbitrator's difficulties in 
that case would not have arisen if he had 
had an unequivocal power to obtain 
independent legal advice. Without that 
power it can be open to a party to drive 
the arbitrator towards an inefficient 
procedure or an award which fails to 
reflect the true merits.
A potential problem with that view is 
that the parties have agreed that a specific 
individual or individuals should decide 
their dispute, or at least agreed or 
assented to the mechanism for the 
tribunal's appointment; and it runs 
contrary to that agreement for the 
arbitrator to subcontract his personal 
obligations (see Threlfall v Fanshawe (1850) 
19 LJQB 334; Giacoma Costa Fu Andrea v 
British Italian Trading Co Ltd [1961] 
2 Lloyd's Rep 392). However, it is 
suggested that there is a fundamentaloo
distinction between an arbitrator 
subcontracting the decision to a third 
party, and merely extending his 
knowledge so as to increase his ability to 
arrive at a decision which is accurate 
within his terms of reference; there is no 
objection, for example, to an arbitrator 
undertaking private research to facilitate 
his legal or technical understanding, ando o
it is suggested that to seek the assistance 
of a qualified individual is simply an 
extension of that exercise. That 
distinction is emphasised if party 
autonomy is preserved so that the 
arbitrator may obtain third party advice 
or assistance 'unless the parties otherwise
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It is suggested that there is a fundamental 
distinction between an arbitrator 
subcontracting the decision to a third party, 
and merely extending his knowledge so as to 
increase his ability to arrive at a decision 
which is accurate within his terms of 
reference; there is no objection, for 
example, to an arbitrator undertaking 
private research to facilitate his legal or 
technical understanding, and it is suggestedo' oo
that to seek the assistance of a qualified 
individual is simply an extension of that 
exercise. That distinction is emphasised if 
party autonomy is preserved so that the 
arbitrator may obtain third party advice or 
assistance 'unless the parties otherwise 
agree'.
It would reduce any concern the 
parties might have that the arbitrator was 
devolving his decision-making onto theo o
third party if the parties were informed 
of what questions were put to the legal or 
expert adviser and the nature of the 
advice. However such a formal method of 
proceeding could reduce the efficiency of 
the mechanism. Thus it would be likely 
to inhibit the free flow of information 
and advice between adviser and arbitrator 
and there would be a severe risk that a 
party disenchanted with an award would 
seek to expose inconsistencies between 
the advice and the award in order to 
impeach it. .
RISK OF SUBCONTRACTING
However it is suggested that, in 
practice, the risk of the arbitrator 
subcontracting his responsibilities is 
slight, for the following reasons:
(1) The appointed arbitrator faces the 
parties at preliminary meetings and at 
the main hearing, so except where the 
dispute does not require such 
processes, it is likely to become 
apparent to the parties if the arbitrator 
is adopting a position which he does 
not in truth understand and support;
(2) It is doubtful that there is much 
profit to be made by arbitrators in 
accepting appointments and 
subcontracting much of the work; 
arbitrators are likely to seek legal or 
expert advice only where issues arise in 
respect of which they require 
clarification, and to the extent that 
they have been appointed because of 
their suitability to decide the dispute, 
such issues are more likely to be 
subordinate than dominant. Certainly,
an arbitrator who subcontracted his 
appointments wholesale would 
severely imperil his reputation;
(3) The arbitrator's entitlement to 
obtain advice could be made subject to 
the parties' agreement to the contrary. 
As such, a single party could not 
disrupt the operation of the 
mechanism as in Colt International, but 
the parties jointly could restrain its 
inappropriate use by the arbitrator.
Undoubtedly there are dangers 
inherent in such a system. Arbitrators 
must take care not to substitute the 
unchallenged views of the expert adviser 
in place of the expert evidence or legal 
argument advanced by the parties. To do 
so would be to fail to act fairly and 
impartially, allowing each party a 
reasonable opportunity7 of putting his 
case and dealing with that of his 
opponent. (The pre-1996 position 
(which it is suggested is still and should 
remain good law, subject to s. 34 of the 
1996 Act), respecting the arbitrator's 
wrongful reliance on his own evidence, is 
expounded in Fox v P G Wellfair Ltd(l98l) 
19 BLR 52 CA; [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
514.) Ultimately the issues in dispute 
must be determined by the arbitrator and 
not the expert.
CHOOSING AN ADVISER
Accepting, on the above analysis, that 
the mechanism is desirable in principle, 
further questions arise concerning its 
operation in practice, specifically 
whether the adviser should be selected by 
the parties, and whether he should attend 
hearings. It is suggested that, in theo oo '
model considered above, the arbitrator 
should not be obliged to approach an 
adviser chosen by the parties; the 
arbitrator himself will be best placed to 
know his own requirements, although he 
may wish to ask the advice of the parties 
jointly. However, it is suggested that the 
parties should have the opportunity' to 
oppose the use of a particular expert 
where there is the possibility of bias and, 
for this reason, the identity' of the expert 
should be disclosed to the parties before 
the advice is sought. While it may be 
desirable to embody in statute the 
requirement to pre-disclose the identity" 
of the intended adviser (see later in this 
section) it is probably unnecessary to 
legislate, in a common law jurisdiction at 
least, for an adviser to be unbiased; 
whether an adviser should be debarred 
from any particular reference could be
adequately dealt with incrementally in 
case law, probably using the same criteria 
as currently exist in English law 
respecting the bias of arbitrators, i.e. 'real 
likelihood' or 'reasonable suspicion' of 
bias (for example, see Hagop Ardahalian v 
Unifert International SA 'The Elissar' [1984]
1 Lloyd's Rep 206, affirmed [1984]
2 Lloyd's Rep 84).
An alternative mechanism could 
involve the use of a legal or technical 
assessor integrated into the process to a 
much greater degree and sitting through 
all, or much of, the entire reference — 
along the lines of the Scottish model (a 
close analogy where the adviser proffers 
legal advice is the system of magistrates' 
clerks in England). The theoretical 
distinction between a mechanism of this 
kind and the former sort is not easy to 
draw: it might be argued that the 
question is only one of degree and the 
latter type is merely the former taken to 
its logical conclusion. However it is 
suggested that there is a fundamental 
difference between, on the one hand, the 
arbitrator privately briefing and taking 
advice from the adviser and, on the other 
hand, the adviser appearing at hearings 
where he or she can hear the evidence 
and arguments of the parties direct and 
possibly participate, e.g. by asking 
questions for clarification. For in the 
latter case, the adviser forms a direct 
relationship with the parties and becomes 
more a limb of the arbitrator himself, 
rather than a wholly independent source 
of assistance. As such it is suggested that 
this mechanism should only be operated 
if both parties agree.
The relationship of the arbitrator and 
the parties is a personal one and a 
participating assessor intrudes upon it. 
He is also more likely, because of his 
deeper involvement in the arbitral 
process, to influence the arbitrator in 
decision-making. It follows that the 
appointee should be nominated or at 
least approved by the parties, rather than 
being selected entirely at the discretion of 
the arbitrator. As in the earlier scheme, 
the arbitrator relies on the expert to the 
extent he considers appropriate and he 
retains responsibility for each decision. 
Therefore it also follows that the 
arbitrator must also agree to the 
procedure: to oblige the arbitrator to 
accept an adviser where he considers it 
inappropriate and does not intend to take 
notice of his advice would achieve 
nothing. 23
EFFICIENT USE OF ADVISER
The use of a participating adviser is 
likely to he particularly efficient where a 
lay arbitrator is appointed to decide the 
dispute because of his highly specialised 
technical understanding, but the disposal 
of the issues requires equally specialised 
legal analysis or, in particular, a highly 
developed understanding of procedure. 
Thus such an assessor could assist the 
arbitrator in deciding whether to order 
particulars of case or statements of case, 
or explain to him the factors legitimately 
to be taken into account on an 
application for security for costs. Yet 
because the participating adviser is not a 
decision-maker, his appointment need 
not be automatic on the commencement 
of an arbitration: he need only be called 
upon if required. This reduces the 
likelihood of costs being incurred 
unnecessarily as would be possible if he 
were appointed as a joint arbitrator. 
Indeed, if a spread of expertise were 
sought to be achieved by enlarging the 
tribunal, at least three arbitrators would 
need to be appointed so as to ensure that 
a decision could be reached by a majority 
in the event of disagreement. (The very 
significant costs sometimes incurred by 
three member tribunals is evident from 
K/S Norjarl A/S v Hyundai Heavy Industries 
Co Ltd (1991) CILL 664, being £1,500 
per day (for the tribunal as a whole) 
during 1990, £1,750 per day during 
1991, and £2,000 per day during 1992,
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with a commitment fee of £67,750.) 
Because the adviser's appointment can be 
made at any time after the 
commencement of the reference, he can 
be selected according to the known 
requirements of the case.
APPROVAL BY THE PARTIES
The relationship of the arbitrator and the 
parties is a personal one and a participating 
assessor intrudes upon it. He is also more 
likely, because of his deeper involvement in 
the arbitral process, to influence the 
arbitrator in decision-making. It follows that 
the appointee should be nominated or at 
least approved by the parties, rather than 
being selected entirely at the discretion of 
the arbitrator.
The disadvantage is that where such an 
appointment seems desirable, one or 
other party may withhold consent for 
strategic reasons. However, as observed 
above, it is necessary that such an
appointment should be consensual. 
Nevertheless, in cases of substance and 
complexity where an appointment is 
more likely to be efficient, each party, or 
his representative, may perceive a mutual 
advantage in proceeding in this manner, 
knowing that even if they withhold 
consent, the arbitrator \\ill nevertheless 
be able to obtain advice privately under 
the first method set out above.
Operating method
It is suggested that the costs incurredoo
in operating either method would be a 
proper cost of the reference.
Both methods are broadly enacted by 
s. 37 of the f996 Act. However, on the 
basis of the above analysis, it is suggested 
that an amendment of the Act is desirable 
so that:
(1)Subsection 37(1) (b), which states 
'the parties shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to comment on any 
information, opinion or advice ...', 
should be omitted. The arbitrator's 
obligations to decide fairlv and
O J
impartially, giving each party a 
reasonable opportunity to present its 
case and test the opponent's (as set 
out in s. 33 of the Act), and the 
subjection of his s. 34 powers to party 
autonomy, are sufficient protection 
for the parties; and an obligation on 
the arbitrator to identify specifically to 
the parties the deliberations of the 
adviser is undesirable for the reasons 
set out above;
(2)Subsections. 37(1) (a) (i) and (ii) need 
to be distinguished so that an 'expert' 
or 'adviser' does not attend the 
proceedings, but an assessor does. 
Appointment of an expert or adviser 
should, as currently provided, be by 
the arbitrator unless the parties agree 
otherwise, but the arbitrator should 
be obliged to notify- the parties of the 
intended identity of the expert or 
adviser;
(3)Appointment of an assessor should be 
expressed to occur:
'If agreed by the arbitrator and the parties, 
and the assessor shall be entitled to play such 
part in the process as the parties may agree 
including:
(a)attending preliminary meetings andjinal 
hearings;
(b)asking questions of the parties or their 
representatives, parties' experts, and 
witnesses, attending inspections;
(c)any other junction that may assist him in
advising the arbitrator as to either 
procedural or substantive issues;
save that only the arbitrator may make and 
shall be responsible Jor any decision in the 
arbitration.'
To enable an assessor to make 
decisions is to confer on him an 
arbitrator's role. To allow him to make 
decisions without appointing him 
arbitrator would be to cause confusion as 
to where the arbitrator's role ended and 
the assessor's began, and the 
enforceability of awards could be called 
into question.
CONCLUSION
In many respects the task of the 
arbitrator is more exacting than that of 
the High Court judge. Whereas the judge 
is entitled and obliged to follow the well- 
trodden paths of the White Book, the 
arbitrator (subject to the contrary 
agreement of the parties) has an 
extremely wide discretion as to 
procedure, and must exercise that 
discretion so as to minimise the time and 
cost of the reference without doing 
damage to the fairness of the award; and
O
if he is a lay arbitrator he may have to do 
this without the benefit of a detailed 
knowledge of the procedural possibilities. 
Where he is a legally qualified arbitrator, 
his situation may more closely parallel 
that of the judge, i.e. whilst thoroughly 
versed in procedural matters, he may 
have to resolve highly specialised 
technical issues and, where those issues 
are the dominant feature of the 
reference, his lack of technical expertise 
may divest the process of any advantage 
over litigation.
Such difficulties may be mitigated by 
the introduction of a greater entitlement 
on the part of the arbitrator to have 
recourse to specialist assistance, and it is 
suggested that the 1996 Act, while partlv
OO 1 J ,
meeting the case, does not go far enough 
and fails to emphasise sufficiently the 
provisions it does make. Thus it is 
suggested that the Act could be amended,oo '
with profit, so as to facilitate the 
arbitrator's access to independent advice 
and to popularise the use of this 
procedural mechanism.  
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